“Sovereignty cannot be acquired by the simple fact of conquest, nor can it pass to the conqueror if the sovereign does not cede it to him. […] Conquering territory brought not strength, but only trouble and expense.”

Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord,

Former Minister of Foreign Affairs to Napoléon Bonaparte

This case focuses on the Putin and Zelensky Doctrines, and identifies various foreign policy factors and motives from the Russian perspective, as well as the Ukrainian. The purpose of this paper is to get a better clarity as to the reasons behind the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, which further ignited the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. The pretext of the biggest conventional war Europe has experienced since the Second World War is years in the making.

The Putin Doctrine

The individuals and groups of Moscow

We begin our consideration of the Putin Doctrine by targeting the micro level of global affairs. This part focuses on leadership, individuals, groups, and state agencies (subnational groups or subunits).

When looking into individuals or subunits, it is rational to think about the various biases, personal beliefs, and inclinations in foreign policy decision-making. This echelon in global affairs implies psychological and behavioral variables since we are dealing with people; a leader has a personal ambition for achieving a certain foreign policy; a group of individuals wish to lead their nation through their way of doing things; or certain state agencies compete for various benefits, whether it is to better position themselves across government in domestic decision-making, perhaps securing new resources or even maintaining political relevancy.

The individual analysis can explain the Putin Doctrine and how the events of the war in Ukraine came to be. The political scientist Robert Jervis helps us understand the one of the main causes of the Russo-Ukrainian war; a grand strategic misperception made by Vladimir Putin and his aides. In the case of misperception, individuals can make erroneous interpretations, miscalculation of outcomes or prejudices of anticipated effects. Moscow’s foreign policy, influenced by members or subunits of people leading the country, led to the war:

“Every war involves at least one serious misperception. If every war has a loser, it will stand to reason that the defeated state made serious miscalculations when it decided to fight” (Robert Jervis).¹

A maverick president, or an autocratic leader such as Vladimir Putin can lead to misperceptions. Added to this is any human’s mindset which is poised for psychological bias and can become a factor misguiding leaders whilst conducting foreign policy. Particularly in judging whether Ukraine will capitulate quickly if facing the prospect of a Russian invasion, Mr. Putin and the Russian military apparatus groups underestimated Ukraine’s resolve to resisting a foreign invader. Exaggerating reasonableness of one’s own position by stating that Russia is conducting a “special military operation” against neo-Nazis within Ukraine would become a foreign policy rhetoric based on psychological bias. Moreover, the belief that the Ukrainian people would capitulate and welcome the Russian troops with open arms and have celebratory military parades was vehemently neutralized immediately as the invasion started.

Graham Allison’s Second Model of domestic organization policy supplements the notion of individual biases and misperceptions. In this case, it is not the mere individual but a network of individuals who are responsible for miscalculations.² The process of certain subunits is flawed and ineffective within Russian leadership, thus incoherent coordination and so the passing of information. One example is Russia’s military generals overestimating their own capability of winning over Ukraine in under 3 weeks of the invasion; the belief of welcoming Ukrainians would speed up the invasion plan but that was demonstrated to be a complete false claim. The Russian military’s overly optimistic sense of grandeur and Moscow’s diplomatic pessimism added fuel to the misperception.

The military strategist and author of works related to grand strategy and international relations, Edward Luttwak, analyses how Mr. Putin’s mindset works in foreign policy, as he deems the Russian leader a “careful poker player”. However, he invites his statement to be counter argued since Mr. Putin failed to assess Ukrainian foreign policy and how strategy could have taken place. The Putin Doctrine in foreign policy is explained by Luttwak as a “scenario that the very modern-minded Russian generals sold to Putin, or Putin accepted or demanded. They all wanted it. And because Ukraine is not a foreign country, according to them, but part of Russia, the (Federal Security Service, or FSB) got the job of doing the intelligence. They were supposed to verify the intelligence that all this is feasible. Moreover, Putin knew the CIA was giving the same estimate to U.S. President [Joe] Biden. Hence Biden offered this rescue to Zelensky […] that Zelensky publicly rejected.”³ In concordance with Luttwak’s description, this psychological bias is present not only in Mr. Putin’s position as a single leader, but in different subunits in the Russian Federation’s domestic government. The misperception was not only present in Russia, but across the Western hemisphere as well. The CIA also miscalculated Zelensky’s response to a Russian invasion of Ukraine. Because both opposing entities thought Zelensky would act a certain way (i.e. escape Ukraine if the invasion occurred), the misperception inevitable held. As such, this goes without saying that “most wars start because someone makes a mistake, and most battles are lost by the losing side rather than won by the victors […]”⁴ If we consider these arguments, ceteris paribus, then the leading decision-makers could explain why the “special military operation in Ukraine” metamorphosed into an actual Russo-Ukrainian conventional war.

To further strengthen this argument, the clear misperception due to a Russian political status quo and conflicting viewpoints across various heads can be noticed when President Macron confirmed Mr. Putin’s promise not to recognize the two Russian proxies in Ukraine’s Donbas. Moreover, on 15 February, 2022, Mr. Putin stated to Germany’s Chancellor Scholz that Russia was not planning to attack Ukraine; “[…] Even the close circle that usually advises Putin on foreign and security policy was caught by surprise when he expressed his intention on 21 Feb­ruary to declare the independence of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) and the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR).”

Therefrom, several internal political movements transpired, with the sidelining of Mr. Putin’s usual circle of advisers (i.e., an internal clash between interest groups fighting for influence). We see this happening during the Security Coun­cil’s meeting on “the recognition of the two ‘republics’ that Russia set in Ukraine’s Donbas, in which Putin publicly humiliated the head of Russia’s elite Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Sergey Naryshkin, along with a couple of other high-level officials.”⁵

The clash of opinions between subunits in Moscow’s leadership is confirmed:

“The SVR is responsible for stra­tegic intelligence and is the country’s most elite and competent intelligence agency. Given this, it is very likely to have provided a more realistic assessment of both Ukraine’s military capability and resolve as well as of the potential impacts of intensified Western sanctions. The defense minister, Sergey Shoigu, along with the head of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardija), Viktor Zolotov, were likely part of the group that side-lined Naryshkin, based on the content of their interventions.”⁶

Mr. Putin’s mindset has shifted considerably. But is it his own mindset that we are talking about, or that of a society as a whole?

“To understand Putin’s rationale is to understand how he interprets Russia’s relationship with Ukraine. Putin describes Ukraine as an inauthentic and inferior state – unworthy of sovereignty. He interprets Russia’s purpose and role in world politics through an imperialist frame and believes that it should dominate others; he believes in spheres of influence as a norm, not as a thing of the past. His distorted version of Ukraine’s history plays into a fantasy of reclaiming what was lost following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Like an abusive partner in a failed marriage, Russia is trying forcefully to lead Ukraine away from European Union and NATO partnerships, and into its orbit which Putin is trying to re-establish. Tragically, this invasion will cost many Russian and Ukrainian lives; it will inflict a trauma that will define Russia-Ukraine relations for decades to come.”⁷

The Russian society, culture, and political ideology

It is possible that the reasoning behind Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could be more deep-rooted than many would believe in the Western hemisphere. Indeed, it is important to consider the Russian society rather than the specified individuals, which may drive foreign policy. The identity of a nation, a culture or an ideology can build a foundation to what current leadership would aspire from. In this situation, the will of a whole nation state (or a country) is a stronger factor that influences foreign policy behavior in leaders than the other way around.

Indeed, the national level implies various types of societies or political practices. International relations scholar and theorist Michael Doyle’s description of “types of government” constitutes one of the most recognizable illustrations of differences across nations and the way they practice foreign policy. A political system in one nation may considerably vary from another’s⁸. And this holds true currently in the 21^st century. Similarly, Samuel Huntington talks about a “clash of civilizations”⁹, whereby culture has had a tremendous influence on the outcome of a nation’s external stance.

The Putin Doctrine may very well be dictated by the distinguishment of the way of handling a political system opposed to Western practices. A most classical divergence is the clash between a democratic western society (e.g. the US and EU) and an autocratic eastern society (e.g. Russia and China). Mr. Putin can be perceived as an autocrat since before the war began, perhaps even considered a dictator once it did, which gives more substance to the argument that types of government were the main reason which eventually led to the war. Ukraine, having long been under the sphere of autocratic instances, is transitioning towards a more democratic nation, hence associating itself with the European values of human rights, liberty, and rule of law. Thus, the Putin Doctrine is not merely led by autocratic figureheads such as Mr. Putin, but mainly because it is implied from Russian political culture. This is an authentic clash in the global arena, namely in the case of foreign policy cultures.

This excerpt, taken from Dr Dumitru Minzarari’s study “Failing to Deter Russia’s War against Ukraine: The Role of Misperceptions”, illustrates how Moscow drives foreign policy, clearly in a very different way than the Western nations do:

“Some of the main factors driving these misperceptions were the largely different foreign policy cultures of the West and Russia. To the West – in particular, to the EU countries – talks are part and parcel of its political culture of consensus, and they are the essence of its diplomacy. Even though the US might have seemed to be tougher on Russia, it has – similarly to the EU – not fully grasped Russia’s foreign policy culture. To Russia, initiating talks when one is believed to have little leverage reveals weakness. To put it straightforwardly, the Russian leadership views talks as the inability to impose one’s will, since if one has the power, one does not need to talk but instead can act and impose the pre­ferred outcome. To use a historical analogy, the difference between Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the USSR is that the Soviet Union leadership was genuinely concerned about security and survival, triggering a security dilemma, whereas modern Russia falsely invokes insecurity in the attempt to erode Western resolve and cover up for its revanchism. The USSR’s foreign policy was guided by a zero-sum logic, whereas the brutality of the foreign policy of today’s Russia is guided by the perceived weakness of the West.”

Mr. Minzarari goes further by invoking the “might is right” code of conduct, which seems to be an informal ruling factor to Russian society and its domestic politics. For instance, Mr. Putin was quoted using the criminal slang demanding the killing of Chechen rebels – mochit’ v sortire (“dunk them in the toilet”)¹⁰. Hence, the Putin Doctrine spawned politicians with a focus on brutality, thereby altering its political culture beyond the domestic agenda.

Equally, the political propaganda machine has resurfaced, reminiscence of the Cold-War era. Moscow’s disinformation tactics are a foreign policy tool. This tool is a by-product of Moscow’s continuously aggressive political culture, which adds further misguidances from the West’s perspective and to that extent, the international community¹¹.

However, the divergence could be deeper. Is the clash of civilization more prominent in the style of the political sphere or rather the historic societal culture? Part of the Mr. Luttwak’s explanation how the invasion happened is because of Russian civilization and its societal collective belief:

“[…] the war was an intellectual war, in the sense that the idea was generated within the Kremlin and the people connected to the Kremlin – that this was the moment for Russia to continue on the path of imperial recovery. And it was supposed to be a continuous process: that is, that South Ossetia was regained without firing a shot, Abkhazia was regained without firing a shot, against the weak state of Georgia.”¹²

Notwithstanding the types of governments, Russian foreign policy is deeply rooted in societal values passed on through generations. Thus is the relevancy of clash of civilizations. Similarly to K.J. Holsti’s American Exceptionalism, Russia evidently possesses its own.

A society with Slavic origins, the Russians have had a long and bloody history which shaped their mentality in what we have come to know. This mentality persists to this day. Prof. Diligensky Guerman Guermanovich, and Dr. Chugrov Sergei Vladislavovich thoroughly depict the evolution of the Russian mentality and how the past may conflict with the present. It mentions a “paradigm of Russia’s opposition to the West” which began to emerge in the 19^th century during the Napoleonic war. But, they say, it is important to note that Russia historically sees the Western civilization (Europe in the past and more recently America) from a plethora of facets.

Diligensky and Chugrov speak about a constant distortion and mirrored reflections of the self-image and of own images. As such, Russia seems to permanently view the West in a two-sided coin fashion; one of positivity and the other of negativity. Given the complicated historical background, Russia admires the technological advancements of the Western world. These have been felt most prominently at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution and by the time the First World War started. This outputs distrust and envies in the Russian people and consequently, its own leadership, raising in turn anxieties or hopes. The Russian behavior is reflected in various stages of its history such as the Tartaric 3-century isolationism of Russia from the Christian West. Their civilization grew in parallel with that of the rest of Europe, whereby traditional adherence to non-freedom and belligerent attitude to neighboring countries marked its society.

Centuries in the making of such societal values led to inherited institutional structures, which resemble more “Asian despotism than European absolutism” of the middle-ages. Then came a reinforcement of such despotism through figureheads such as Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great.

Russian culture is therefore resistant to Westernization. Diligensky and Chugrov describe Russia as one of the most opposing nations to the French Revolution of 1789, stating that it is Russia’s resilient principles of a predominantly well-engrained religious Christian orthodox community as an “ideal society” which may have developed a strong barrier to other notions such as formal rights and the idea of individual freedom. By contrast, the reality was in fact, as quoted Diligensky and Chugrov, a “mixture of legal and religious rules resulting in an unstructured complex network of relations between individuals and the state. This sort of collectivism paralyzed much individual responsibility. In reality, traditional ethical norms are often in conflict with the law. In extreme form, under Love, slavery is a happiness.”¹³

The term of duality under the Russian political culture is most noticeable. Russia has a strong peasant community, called mir. The mir over the centuries “emerged as a complex phenomenon with many elements of a parochial isolated community based on the idea of sacrificing individual rights for the sake of collectivist values. This imperative has turned out to be disastrous for Russia, leading to bloodshed and martyrs.”¹⁴ This mindset is further reinforced through the numerous Russian intellectuals of the 19th century who reject the rule of law and install ethical norms instead. Diligensky and Chugrov therefore describe the Russian legal tradition as weak, hence a clear differentiator between types of governments between the West and Russia even if there were westernized tendencies across the centuries, such as Katherine the Great’s “initiated elections to the Legislative Commission in 1767 to consider the problems of rights” or after 1861, when Tsar Alexander II “initiated a discussion of reforming the state’s legal system in order to give rights to the representatives of new estate […] closer to European standards.”

As a consequence, this particular analysis showcases a “conflictual nature of Russian society”, which is key to driving national self-identification in foreign policy, specifically with the West. Being in the middle of two continents, Russia always oscillated between “self-isolation and openness to the outer world”. Given this historical geopolitical context (i.e. hordes of invaders passing through present-day Russia over the centuries, conquests, martyrs, suffering of the peasants, etc.), the Russian mentality inevitably inherited psychological trauma, nurtured by a sense of anxiety and lack of stability across its extremely diverse society.

Diligensky and Chugrov describe the constant duality issue among the Russian society as follows:

“The Russian society demonstrates today generally more positive attitudes to the West during the Cold War period. This pro-Western orientation is especially strong in […] the younger generation, private businesses, and a part of intellectuals. Nevertheless, such a tendency in many respects remains unstable and ambivalent. The main source of this ambivalent situation is a self-propelled conflict between traditionalistic cultural trend, which demonstrates certain inertia, adherence to old stereotypes and myths, on the one hand, and pragmatic needs and motivations nurturing the modernization tendency, on the other. The most influential factor determining Russia’s perception of the West is undoubtedly the internal socio-economic, political and cultural development of the country. However, these processes cannot avoid certain influence from the West. In this respect, different forms of direct Western assistance to Russia is not so important as the general “tonality,” or “style” of such policies. Russian national consciousness, as we have shown in the above analysis, is highly vulnerable and very sensitive to any interference or “signals” sent from the West. Any symptoms of hostile aspirations, denigrating attitudes to Russian problems and interests are capable of provoking serious negative shifts in Russia’s perception of the West. They can easily damage the image of the Western model and give impetus to nationalistic trends. The opposite is also correct: any gestures of sympathy, compassion, esteem vis-à-vis Russia are capable of strengthening prestige of Western values, its economic and political institutions in Russian society.”¹⁵

A society deemed as a “Great Power Nation” entails a rich history behind the making of such great power nation. Not only do we have a communist-based affiliation with its more recent past in the 20^th century, but the Russian Federation is in fact the remnants of once a great empire in Eurasian history. One of the largest empires in history, imperial Russia extended from Eastern Europe to the Western Pacific, and encompassed hundreds of ethnicities with their own religions and cultural practices. The empire existed from 1712 to 1914, following Nikolai II Romanov’s abdication at the start of the Bolshevik revolution. Russian mentality was nurtured in centuries of expansionism, conquests, repressions, and resistance to foreign invaders. This mentality still holds ground today within the Russian Federation. Hence, a true leader of Russia must bring victories of conquest to its people to support the leadership’s credibility and legitimacy; an ancient value and one of the core duties a Tsar must achieve to maintain status. In fact, Mr. Putin compared himself to Peter the Great, an allegory highlighting the Russia’s grand imperial status, now perceived as a resurfacing grand strategy for the Putin Doctrine in foreign affairs. Ergo, the emperor protects his subjects and brings glory to his subjects; the Russian population.¹⁶

The analysist Piontkovski demonstrates this societal resolve in the Putin Doctrine during this Russo-Ukrainian war:

“A more recent example in the middle of the war is Russia’s victory over Lysychansk and the full control of the region of Luhansk. As such, these types of symbolic victories help Putin keep his power. He sells the Russians the supposedly primordial return of Russian land. The celebration for the occupation of Lysychansk is a repetition for the next one, this being the Kremlin’s strategy. With this victory, Putin assures himself and prepares his people when in two months they will be able to sell the victory for the reestablishment of the entirety of the territories around the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.”¹⁷

Alternatively, Immanuel Kant’s liberal internationalism in conflict represents another aspect concurring the existence of a clash of civilization between the West and Moscow. Peace between democracies and the creation of pacific federations and military alliances shows protectionism from external geopolitical threats. The EU and NATO can be argued as cases in point for this argument. It is true that autocracies tend to provoke more wars, although democracies can also act as the aggressor; “[…] to protect and promote – sometimes forcibly – democracy, private property, and the rights of individuals overseas against nonrepublics… these wars may liberate oppressed individuals overseas; they can also generate enormous suffering.”¹⁸ Our case of the Russo-Ukrainian war is a great example, whereby the EU and NATO support Ukrainian democracy against pro-Russian separatists and Moscow’s interference since Crimea’s annexation of 2014.

Russia’s international security and deterrence system

It is difficult not to talk about global affairs without studying its macro-scaled implications. A nation’s stance against externalities rests upon its own protection and national security. The nation depends on several foreign policy mechanisms for ensuring its own survival. Hence, these implications offer a potential source for paradigm shifts in the current global balance of power, or in other words, the world order.

We associate a nations’ need to survive similarly to the survival of a human being. The right to exist and to prosper is, as such, existent among all nations. This is why there are national security systems put into place such as border protection or military agencies supplying a nation’s armed forces. In many ways, competition between countries drives growth, and technological milestones are their by-product. The nuclear arms race represents the most iconic form of deterrence which allows nations to gain a competitive stance among its peers. This process keeps in check the current world order.

Consequently, the Hobbesian state of Nature¹⁹ in humans are well reflected among nations at the international scale. Under the Putin Doctrine, Mr. Putin and his aides repeatedly stated on several occasions that the Ukraine invasion duped as a “special military operation” was excused by the existence of dangerous fascist groups located in Ukraine that threaten the livelihoods of Russian-speaking ethnic groups. It is therefore Russia’s responsibility to ensure the survival of their culture and way of lives. Many of such foreign interventions can be classified as instances driven by a self-help system²⁰. As Kenneth Waltz describes, states need to protect themselves from external threats. In an anarchical universe, as reflected by the Hobbesian State of Nature, many nations worldwide apply preemptive measures if their national security are assessed as threatened. In other words, there is no Law, only that of Nature. Alliances may form to create a powerful deterrent against any external threat to targeted regions. In this case, the Putin Doctrine would be no different. Specifically, a nation which applies self-help techniques infers a distrust of the existing global consensus. Indeed, Russia has been historically reluctant on several occasions regarding UN resolutions and would at times utilize its veto powers to block or obstruct decision-making across international institutions. Such actions are evidently for Moscow’s own foreign policy benefit. Disregarding double standards; because that is how other powerful G nations certainly operate alike; Moscow’s case highlights a perpetual resistance to external factors, constantly favoring its border security. Moscow’s self-help tip-of-the-iceberg emerged when it illegally; to the eye of the global forum; annexed Crimea to “protect” and incorporate the security of Russian-speaking ethnic majority in the peninsula to the Russian Federation. Same could be said when Mr. Putin legitimized the separatist nations of the Donbass and Luhansk. He saw nobody would accept such a decision, so Moscow took it upon itself to support its own claims, ergo the self-help approach. More interestingly and following current events with the impact of sanctions, we notice how Moscow relies on clandestine practices to support the financing of the war in Ukraine. Limited in international trade and access to external resources due to sanctions, Russia turned to private mercenary groups such as their Wagner Group to deal with other autocratic nations (who have little love for Western values and international principles) to conduct business. The emergence of Russian presence in Sudan and the illegal exploitation of Sudanese gold is an impactful example on how Moscow tries to self-help its military financing hurdles by going through its own channels.²¹

The 2020s is the decade of paradigm shifts. It is fueled by the 4^th Industrial Revolution and rising forces drive competition at the global stage. The Putin Doctrine, among other ideologists such as XI Jinping’s China, talk about a new world order. Mr. Putin and his aides quoted this on several occasions. Hans Morgenthau’s Balance of Power²² can help us explain this phenomenon.

Indeed, it is true that 30 years of US hegemony (1990s-2020s) have retracted to disturb the current world order. That is, at least, how Moscow and Beijing perceive as new world order. The status quo is being challenged. As a consequence, we could be witnessing the emergence of a tripolar system; and the Great Nation Powers are the US, China, and Russia. The Balance of Power marks a reflection of how powers (i.e., nation states) tilt geopolitical tensions for several reasons. They either want to secure their borders; protectionism; or they desire to eliminate an opponent and incorporate their region due to scarcity or other socio-economic factors; expansionism. A classical modal of a bipolar system was the Cold-War; the Soviet bloc with its satellite states and allies and the Western bloc with its own. Today, it would be thought-provoking to note how a tripolar system would interact and how alliances and other smaller nation states would co-exist around these. More importantly, it is worth noting that two of the current Great Power Nations are autocratic in nature and so begs the question whether an imbalance will occur in the race for worldwide power. The word “hybrid war” has been surfacing lately, which suggests Washington’s and Moscow’s “indirect” participation in the Ukraine war for advancing their own reach of influence in the region, hence the balance of power game.

Nevertheless, this macro analysis should not be overstretched. For many, Russia’s very own existence is not at all threatened to the point of annihilation, at least not yet. Otherwise the prospects for nuclear weapons usage would have been a much more indicative factor to explaining the war in Ukraine. Indeed, at the end of the day we are talking about an invasion and occupation of Ukraine rather than a pure zero-sum outcome, whereby only one of both nations must be completely obliterated as to ensure the survivability of the other (i.e., Russia destroying Ukraine with nuclear weapons). Fortunately under this perspective, this is not the current case for the Putin Doctrine.

One other key explanation at the macro socio-economic scale is Moscow’s need for more territorial ground, giving it wider access to the seas and resources and therefore trading routes. The Donbass and Luhansk regions are historically rich industrial and agricultural zones. They represented the backbone of the USSR’s mining system for coal extraction, steel works and farmlands. In fact, the whole region of Ukraine was a significant grain stock for the east bloc. Furthermore, Russia’s Crimea annexation may not only have happened because of Russian ethnic groups living there, but rather because of a much more significant access and thus control (now at around 50%) of the Black Sea. A most recent military doctrine for Moscow’s foreign policy can be seen in its naval forces during the Navy Day celebration. Mr. Putin promised to deliver the most state-of-the-art missiles to create a powerful deterrent against NATO, and most specifically the US at seas.²³

Furthermore, to understand the Putin Doctrine, we can refer back to George Kennan’s time during the Cold War. His shifting foreign policy attitudes we most noticeably in the late 40s and 50s. He effectuated a change from western containment policy to the USSR to a period of détente with the Soviet bloc.²⁴ The reason behind his fears were the increasing risk of balance of power destabilization that would outweigh the needs and wants of societal and cultural competition between the two blocs. The idea that a nuclear arms race would fuel the new status quo of Mutually Assured Destruction (or MAD) dwarfs in comparison to the expansion of a Great Power State’s ideological political belief. Mr. Kennan was more concerned about Europe’s security, and specifically, ensuring a German reunification. He thus drew criticism of NATO expansionism and warned about his own previous policy of containment (with his Mr. X article) to western officials. He insisted on switching lenses to the Soviet bloc’s perspective of self-help system, which does not differ much from the US’s and its allies; this was ground for commonality, not the political ideology. Still to this day, the Putin Doctrine continues its criticism for NATO expansionism. Their security system being pressured, one might understand Mr. Kennan’s arguments of risk for destabilizing the status quo. However, it is important to point out that it was the start of the war in Ukraine that prompted Finland and Sweden to join NATO and allowed Ukraine’s military and economy a rapprochement with the West. Whether the war could have been prevented had Ukraine joined NATO, or other candidate states before, is difficult to retrospect.

These macro reasons mark another case in point regarding the balance of power as perceived by Moscow and its strategic deterrence system to ensure its security; Hobbesian State of Nature. We should reiterate that in many developing or low developed regions across the globe, the scarcity of resources drives strong competition between nations to the point of igniting conflicts. China’s tension with Taiwan may also represent a similar trend if we follow this logic.

In what concerns Russia, it is of course complex to assess what the real explanation for the start of the war in Ukraine may be. Nevertheless, a combination of factors, causes and effects, led to its spark. Mr. Putin’s maverick mindset and sense of grandeur coupled with the Russian society’s historical resilience to external changes have created a loophole, fueling itself to further raise barriers to threats whether domestic or external. In the end, the Putin Doctrine has come full circle: it feeds on the creation of characters shaped by its tradition and culture, whom therefrom continue to instill the same ideas their society taught them, for the sake of conservation. Thus, their notion of existence is preserved whether at the individual or the national level. Cleary, Moscow is not the only one exercising this continuous lifecycle. It is just another case manifested universally in global affairs. Ergo, the wheel of intertwined domestic and foreign affairs keeps on spinning.

The Zelensky Doctrine

Leader and people of Ukraine

On the other side of the spectrum, we notice how Ukraine’s foreign policy began to surface its own strategy. Indeed, the Zelensky Doctrine is an opposite to what the Kremlin’s foreign policy machine instills at the global scale.

Firstly, we need to assess the type of character that is President Volodymyr Zelensky. His background is perceived as quite exceptional given the geopolitical context that is Ukraine, Russia, and to the broader extent, the Slavic people. His leadership is considerably distinguished once the war ignited, which helped him foster a unique image of his persona.

From Jewish origins, Mr. Zelensky grew up in the dominantly Russian-speaking region of Southeastern Ukraine. It is important to notice how today’s Ukraine is a historical Soviet-bloc region that is friendlier to Jewish communities than other parts of central/eastern Europe; “A Pew Research Center poll in 2019 found that 5% of Ukrainians were unwilling to accept Jewish people as fellow citizens, compared with 18% in Poland, 19% of Czechs and 22% in Romania.”²⁵

It was therefore difficult to comprehend Mr. Putin’s defense that Russia’s invasion was developed to “denazify” Ukraine’s leadership. This later drew ridicule and harsh criticism from the international community, further fueling foreign policy miscalculations out of psychological biases.

Nonetheless, Mr. Zelensky has created his own maverick style of a leader. This style appeals to Western values and coupled with this mentality is Mr. Zelensky’s highly charismatic value as a public figure. Mr. Zelensky became president of Ukraine with little knowledge of traditional political experience. Before his election, he was an actor, famous in the Slavic communities. Most noticeably, he starred in the television role as an ordinary schoolteacher accidentally propelled into the presidency seat; the show is “Servant of the People” and currently figures on Netflix.

Once the invasion began, he became the “apex of a sophisticated public relations effort to build global backing for Ukraine.”²⁶ Filming in the streets of Kyiv with hand-shots as he addressed the UN and US Congress, he managed to tailor his messages to precision in order to align with the beliefs and values of his audiences.

However, as Mr. Putin’s misperceptions, so did Zelensky gave way to his own. The probability of the Russian invasion to occur was estimated lowly from Zelensky’s viewpoint:

“He said US warnings of an imminent invasion were overblown and were damaging Ukraine’s economy. Mr. Zelensky pointed to an even larger Russian buildup last spring that was eventually withdrawn.”²⁷

Furthermore, the Zelensky Doctrine is somewhat more of a collective thinking rather the persona in itself. According to a WSJ article, domestic pressure by groups and the general populace led to Mr. Zelensky’s decision to take on a more hardline approach on foreign policy with Russia. Indeed, Mr. Zelensky’s initial thoughts were to seek a rapprochement with Russian after he was elected in 2019. Diplomatic ties were sour to say the least, once the Kremlin annexed Crimea in 2014 and energized a rebellion in the two pro-Russian regions of Donbass and Luhansk. In fact, it was his electoral foreign policy agenda to improve relations with Mr. Putin. For instance, he secured a prisoner exchange with Moscow and was approaching a deal on a 2015 cease-fire agreement. Thus, we see here a persona that would have been considerably different to that of post-Russian invasion of February 2022.

The Zelensky Doctrine, in all its forms, is something else. Mr. Zelensky received pressure from his own domestic affairs when street protests against his plans of rapprochement obliged him to shift his foreign policy with Russia. To add up, external forces from the international community, specifically Western diplomats, cautioned against reaching an arrangement with Mr. Putin. A potential deal with him would have provided Mr. Putin with “long-term influence over Ukraine’s future via Russia’s proxies in the breakaway regions”, and to a broader extent, “the goal of barring the country from joining the EU or NATO.” When the invasion began, Mr. Zelensky adopted the voice of the citizens of Ukraine by stating that “the Ukrainian people were now fighting to become equal members of the EU—with many paying the ultimate price.”²⁸

The TV show is an ironic fit to the current stance of the young leader. The successful show persuaded Mr. Zelensky to get into politics. His campaign reflected many core democratic values drawn from the show such as human rights, freedom of speech and the fight against corruption. Moreover, his political party took the same name of the show, “Servant of the People.” He won the election against Mr. Poroshenko with about 73% of the vote, a considerable gap.²⁹

The Ukrainian society, culture, and political ideology

So if the Zelensky Doctrine is driven more by a domestic collective mindset, then what would be the historical background behind the Ukrainian antipathy to Russian subjugation?

From Mr. Putin’s foreign policy practices, Moscow deems Kyiv as part of historical imperial Russia. Mr. Putin does not recognize modern Ukraine’s sovereignty. He says it was created by Russia; Bolshevik’s Communist Russia. He explains the existing ethnic and societal tensions in Ukraine as arising from “both before and after the Great Patriotic War”, where “Stalin incorporated in the USSR and transferred to Ukraine some lands that previously belonged to Poland, Romania and Hungary. In the process, he gave Poland part of what was traditionally German land as compensation, and in 1954, Khrushchev took Crimea away from Russia for some reason and also gave it to Ukraine. In effect, this is how the territory of modern Ukraine was formed.”³⁰

To continue, Mr. Putin speaks about the 1917 October Revolution and the Civil War after that, whereby the Bolsheviks initiated “a new statehood.” He reveals the debates in 1922 between the leaders at the time; Joseph Stalin as General Secretary of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the People’s Commissar for Ethnic Affairs, and Lenin. Stalin wanted to build the country “on the principles of autonomisation that is, giving the republics – the future administrative and territorial entities – broad powers upon joining a unified state.” Lenin countered by suggesting compromises with the nationalists, or “independents”. In essence, Mr. Putin says it was thanks to Lenin’s ideas which laid the foundation of Soviet statehood that led to “a confederative state arrangement and a slogan about the right of nations to self-determination, up to secession.”³¹

As a consequence, why is the Ukrainian nation considering itself a sovereign state in and of itself? We observe Ukrainian nationalism in the changes of names of the various locations, cities and regions who were associated to the era of the Soviet bloc. The most significant transformation is the name of the Ukrainian capital, previously known as Kiev. It is now officially recognized at the UN stage as Kyiv. The meaning behind this alteration is the transliteration into English from the original Ukrainian name of the Ukrainian capital. Adopting this rebranding confirms a real Ukrainian sense of sovereign state among its society. “By doing so you recognize the fact that it is Ukrainian. By not doing so you question the fact that it is a Ukrainian city,” according to Dr. Yuri Shevchuk, lecturer of Ukrainian language in the department of Slavic languages at Columbia University:

“To put it plainly, it’s about whether you agree with the worldview of Vladimir Putin. If you use Kiev you signal […] that you support Russian imperialism. Just like you would insist on calling the Polish city of Wroclaw with its German name Breslau as if it were still occupied by the Nazis.”³²

The analysis of Ivashkiv, director of the Ukrainian Studies program and Slavic Languages Program coordinator at The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, talks about a highly politized motive to alter the name, because of oppressive history of the Russian Empire, “which treated the Ukrainian language with utmost hostility, hindering its development and even officially prohibiting its use” and later during the Soviet Union.

Specifically, Kiev is the name originally translated from the Russian Slavic language, not the Ukrainian language. This is why Ukraine’s type of civilization, albeit of Slavic origin, is nonetheless distinct to that of Russian belief. Or that is at least the way the Zelensky Doctrine perceives it. The image of Ukraine from Mr. Putin’s Russia is rebuffed in the Maidan Revolution of 2014, which is core to the societal level that drove the Zelensky Doctrine.

Senior analyst Jeffrey Mankoff’s analysis on “Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict” tells more about the modernization of the Ukrainian civic identity. Indeed, he shares how Mr. Putin drove Moscow’s policy on the pretext that Ukraine and Belarus national identities are “artificial”, ergo weak. The Putin Doctrine emphasizes “the organic unity of the Russian Empire and its people; especially its Slavic, Orthodox core […].”³³ In his research, Mr. Mankoff identifies the political style branded by historian Timothy Snyder as “politics of eternity; the belief in an unchanging historical essence.” However, in the last three decades, and in particular ever since the 2014 Maidan “Revolution of Dignity” in Kyiv, led to a firm establishment of Ukrainian civic identity. The younger generation post-USSR grew up in a sovereign, independent nation of Ukraine, unlike many generations beforehand. As such, Ukraine is in the midst of transitioning towards a more vigorous democracy, with a prospect on European inclinations. Thus, the current Russo-Ukrainian war has only further strengthened the Ukrainian resolve for its own civic identity.

It is also important to note the regional differences in present day Ukraine. Indeed, throughout the centuries, the Ukrainian region like many other nations in Eastern Europe, went through traumatic experiences as we have clearly seen during the Russian Empire and the Soviet bloc. However, the region was historically split in half; the western region, which was controlled by the Austro-Hungarian empire (Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia) and the eastern part by the Russian Empire. Relatively speaking, the Hapsburg were a much more liberal house than the Tsars of Russia. As a consequence of this discrepancy, the inhabitants of present-day Ukraine have shared mixed cultures and societal values over the centuries; conflicting and consistent all alike as Ukrainian nationalism began its ascent in the 19^th century. The 20^th century has brought even more changes to the people who lived in present-day Ukraine. The atrocities the people in this region suffered from WW1 to the Holocaust marked a nation torn apart between extremes such as Stepan Bandera’s Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which collaborated with the Nazis and manifested some of the worst atrocities against the Jewish population in WW2, and the repressive Soviet Union, which began to associate “Banderites” (supporters of Bandera) as “Ukrainian nationalism, ethnic cleansing, and foreign manipulation”. Even to this day, the Putin Doctrine denounces Ukraine’s post 2014 governments as adopting a “Banderite” policy. On the other side of the spectrum, an independent Ukraine developed a different approach to what traditional Russian belief is:

“[A] shared national identity among its inhabitants through education, official memory, the media, legislation, and other tools. Measured by language use, religious affiliation, ethnic self-identification, and political outlook, a much higher percentage of Ukrainian citizens today see themselves first and foremost as Ukrainian, including in parts of the country where Russian remains the predominant language.”³⁴

Ukrainian domestic policy has considerably shifted away from Russia’s standpoint. By 2001, there were more Ukrainian speakers across the country, except in Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk; “today, more than two-thirds of Ukrainian citizens claim Ukrainian as a native language; even in eastern regions, a plurality is bilingual in Ukrainian and Russian. The shift reflects both state policy (as in education), as well as individual decisions.”³⁵ Indeed, the former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signed in 2019 a language law in which it promises the “Ukrainification” of education, media, and administration. The Ukrainian language was henceforth designated as the official state language. Moreover, the law requires all media outlets to publish in Ukrainian (along with parallel versions in other languages).

To add further depth to the ethnic divide between Russians and Ukrainians, the topic of religion considerably contributed to this as well. Before 2014, the majority of Orthodox Ukrainians kept their allegiance to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), which was founded in the last days of the Soviet Union as a self-governing branch of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). Nevertheless, after the Ukrainian independence “clerics aligned with president Kravchuk set up a rival Orthodox Church headed by its own patriarch in Kyiv, which the ROC and most of the global Orthodox community regarded as illegitimate.”³⁶ Consequently, it should come as no surprise that Ukrainian foreign policy, displayed by the Zelensky Doctrine, has reflected a more westerner-inclined approach, thus showcasing a rapprochement with the EU bloc and even an aspiration towards NATO membership.

In this situation thus, the Zelensky Doctrine demonstrates a difference not only in types of government, but fundamentally, a different direction on the path of Slavic civilizations. So then what are the main roots of Russian and Ukrainian civilizations?

Kyiv’s and Moscow’s commonality?

If Ukrainian and Russian mentalities are so divergent nowadays, why do entities still insist on imposing their beliefs with the result of this war? Moscow has a long use of rhetoric that a “Kyivan Rus” state justifies its expansionist behavior. On the one hand, the Putin Doctrine according to Christoph Mick, is “this Orthodox medieval state which centered around the contemporary Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, as the common point of origin for both Ukrainians and Russians. To his mind, this means the Ukrainian people are Russian. And he [Putin] believes his mission is to restore the unity of the Russian lands, as a precondition for Russia being a great power.” The existence of Russian Exceptionalism is clearly present in this case and this goes hand-in-hand with the imperialistic nature of Russian expansionism. On the other hand, the same author describes that Ukrainians consider “the same place as the Kyivan Rus and the cradle of their own nation; i.e. these are not Russian lands but the ‘lands of the Rus’. The word Rus derives from the old east Slavic word Роусь (which reads as ‘Rous’ when you convert from Cyrillic into Roman letters). The word refers to the land of a people called Rus: the common ancestors of today’s Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians.”³⁷ After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the religious leaders in Moscow decided on a transfer of the Byzantine empire, whereby Moscow was now “the third Rome and the capital of Christendom.” Henceforth, Ivan III dubbed himself not only “grand prince”, but “tsar”, a derivative from the roman word Caesar.

Kyiv is therefore a crucial existential center to Russia and Ukraine due to its historical significance. According to an article in the World History Encyclopedia, the Kievan Rus (862-1242) was a federation during the Middle Ages located in modern-day Belarus, Ukraine, and part of Russia:

“The Rus ruled from the city of Kyiv; ‘Kievan Rus’ simply meant ‘the lands of the Rus of Kiev’.”

Several historical annals reveal that the Rus may have been the name used to refer to the Scandinavian Vikings who were welcomed to the land; “to rule and maintain order in their country in the mid-9th century CE. Three brothers, including one named Rurik, accepted the invitation and founded the Rurik Dynasty which would last for over 700 years.”³⁸

Zero-Sum – A sticky fact

The Zelensky Doctrine is a clear response to the Putin Doctrine. Both doctrines have been in the making over the last 30 years. It looks like one could not exist without the other as both foreign policies attempt at interpretating the historical and socio-economic background of their people. Having the same or similar traditional ethnic roots does not necessarily imply same civic identity, nor does it infer same religious belief or political affiliation. It is worth pointing out that the reasons behind the Russo-Ukrainian war revolve around a clash of belief within the Slavic nations, molded down by historical and modern paradigm shifts. Most critically, we are not talking about a clash of types of government; one democratic and the other autocratic. These are just the tools employed by both doctrines to assert their domestic and foreign policy positions. Evidently, a zero-sum outcome is at play. Finding a positive one, may be even harder to grasp.

What if Vladimir Putin was not president of the Russian Federation? Would the outcome have been the same? Would Kyiv and Moscow have had a different relationship? Might it be possible that the Putin Doctrine, which rose to protect Russian values, and to that extent, the way Slavic societies always ought to be in the traditional mindset, created by mistake the Zelensky Doctrine? Would the Zelensky Doctrine therefore be perceived as a newer version of a Slavic nation, fighting the older one? Irony does not fall short on this debate. Mr. Putin’s Russian philosophy criticizes western aggressive provocations by helping Ukraine and thus continuing the war. But if one states what it fears most, then one inevitably transpires these thoughts into reality. You sow what you reap; and so perhaps the Putin Doctrine, out of fear, indirectly fabricated the Zelensky Doctrine.

To conclude, I would like to draw a quote from Robert Cooper’s “The Ambassadors”. A segment invokes Talleyrand’s thoughts on Napoleon’s imperial expansionism of Europe and what he learned from a tumultuous era in foreign policy:

“Talleyrand, who had seen Napoleon’s conquests evaporate, wrote in his instructions to himself for Vienna that ‘sovereignty cannot be acquired by the simple fact of conquest, nor can it pass to the conqueror if the sovereign does not cede it to him’. […] It lay behind his ready acceptance of the partition of Holland, which he regarded as an artificial creation: Belgium has a history and a society too different from that of Holland to allow the two to fit easily into a single whole. Conquering territory brought not strength, but only trouble and expense […]”³⁹

So then, to what end is the Russo-Ukrainian war worth continuing for the invader? Napoleon failed in this endeavor and many others before and after him. Thus is the importance of History and lessons learned about zero-sum outcomes.

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Notes

(sursa foto: romania.europalibera.org/a/31694917.html)