Gianluca Moldovan The three levels of analysis with respect to the Bush Doctrine
Part 1
First level of analysis with respect to the Bush Doctrine
My paper analysis starts off at the first level surrounding the Bush doctrine events. Several of the proposed readings gave numerous examples at the individual level of the Bush administration.
Indeed, it is impossible for me to avoid not talking about Jervis’ “Understanding the Bush Doctrine” article and the strong links associated to his other writings about the misperceptions of individuals in foreign affairs. The first paragraph on page 368 depicts the optimism of the state officials and sub-groups around president Bush 43 exactly a week after the events of 9/11. This section explains how Bush talked with his closest advisors, suggesting how opportunistic these terrible events were seen, for state officials. This is in fact an overestimation of one’s beliefs that individuals can change the course of history by restructuring the world order. In reality, we are noticing a pattern of psychological biases arising from these thoughts at the highest level possible, as was Bush quoted in that section: “We are not going to miss that opportunity to make the world more peaceful and more free.” Consequently, such a declaration might be linked to one of Bush’s principle, namely this need of assertive spread of democracy by the United States into Iraq and thus ignite a regime change from the existing authoritarian Saddam Hussein.
To add more in-depth study to the reading mentioned above, we can associate the latter to Jervis’ “War and Perception” paper, on page 690. Specifically, we observe a section which describes how people manifest more attention to “dramatic events”, hence paying closer awareness to crises and/or threatening events, such as was the case with the 9/11 attacks. A dissimilar situation to such moments would be for instance successful long-term cooperation in foreign affairs diplomacy, something which I can say is safe to mention, when for instance Iraq and Saddam’s government were receiving logistical support on behalf of the U.S. during the 1980s Iraq-Iran war. Although this is a barely scratching-the-surface example, we obviously weigh down, as human beings, the threats and thus traumatizing events more than positive sum-outcomes. For this reason, psychological biases were intensely present once 9/11 happened, and as the papers suggest, Bush and his advisors were left shocked and incited them to push even further the Bush Doctrine. This also might have led to a level of distrust on the international forum, following possible UN vetoing resolutions prior to the invasion of Iraq, hence depicting the Bush administration’s unilateral and use of primacy use of military forces as an act of preventive war principles.
To continue, the idea of irrationality is clearly showcased in the Bush administration, and so, as Allision stated in his „Conceptual Models & the Cuban Missile Crisis” article, the rationality model in foreign affairs at the first level, cannot hold any logical truth. Even more, overestimations of one’s capabilities surfaced because of individual irrationality, such as this infatuation for stating the false realities of the existence of WMDs in Iraq. Instead, the Bush Doctrine’s moves for the principles mentioned above were more distinguishable within Model III of the Bureaucratic Politics, whereas individuals influence the political system and government bodies. As was noticed on page 707-708 of Alisson’s articles on how the Kennedy’s treated the Cuban missile crisis, so is the case similar with Bush and his advisors. A specific case is clearly shown on page 385 of Jervis’ “Understanding the Bush Doctrine”, where Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. National Security Advisor, is criticized by the author and showing effectively how easy it is to forget about one’s background expertise, in this case “basic international politics”, because she started misperceiving the power of Saddam’s regime, thus overestimating in reality, the threat level of an underdeveloped Iraq in its military capabilities.
As a consequence, a lot of the Bush doctrine events, which led to the Iraq war, were in fact based on emotional outcomes at the individual level. It is very plausible that the making and, therefrom implementation of the National Security Act of 2002, was instigated by several first level movements, and that principles such as the primacy and assertive spread of democracy by America, were in the end sparked by state officials and so their chance for seizing the opportunity of their lifetimes as politicians.
Second level of analysis with respect to the Bush Doctrine
I continue my analysis by diving into second level. In this perspective, the Bush doctrine may have been influenced by something greater than just the individuals who leaded the US between the timeframe of 9/11 to the Iraq war. Indeed, a consistent recurrence I have evaluated across several readings is this emphasis put upon American exceptionalism. More specifically, one could imply that the implementation of the Bush doctrine might have been proportionate to the rise of new fundamentalism, reflecting to an American status quo going back to the founding fathers. This argument says that, at the state (or society) level, the United States are in fact, a „chosen” nation designated by a “higher power” to lead the planet to freedom and spread its principles.
For instance, if we look carefully into the reading “The End of the Neo Conservative Moment” on page 8, regarding the Bush Doctrine, Ikenberry reflects upon the nature of the so-called golden age of new fundamentalism in 2002, after the National Security Strategy agenda was reported. This section goes on saying how this movement is linked back to neo-conservatism among the American political sphere. To put things into perspective, there is a consistent vision of unparalleled, American military influence and historically nurtured ideology for expanding American liberalism into the world. It goes without saying that these ideologies directly link back to the Bush Doctrine’s principles of assertive spread of democracy and US hegemony for global stability by the use of the primacy of force. This powerful interconnected situation demonstrates how resolved America has been throughout History, when it came to ascertaining their might, as the most special and powerful nation the world has ever known. 9/11 was therefore just a small precursor for allowing American fundamentalism to gain more momentum, which eventually led to the Iraq invasion. To add up, Ikenberry’s article on page 10 indicates “the Wilsonian ideas” for spreading democracy to authoritarian regions such as was the case with Saddam’s Iraq. This illustrates to preponderant necessity for liberation of the World to the American view. We can as a result also link back this concept to
Evidently, this argument can be paralleled with Holsti’s „Exceptionalism in American foreign policy: Is it exceptional?” article, wherefrom the author lists five essential characteristics of exceptionalism on page 384. The first two points properly reflect the arguments made above. However, one of them in particular captured my mind, this being the 3rd one addressing the following: “Exceptionalist states usually see themselves existing in a hostile world. Threats are universalized.” This aspect can be linked back to the traditional neo-conservative vision, whereas there is distrust of other nations in foreign affairs and so threats are globalized. Therefore, terrorism does not have a face to the American fundamentalist. They can be anybody who simply hates America and so anybody can be an enemy of the State. To further this approach, we can also imply that the Bush doctrine was portrayed as adopting a violent instigator behavior post-9/11 (see table on page 389 Holsti reading), which meant that armed intervention in Iraq was in fact justifiable according to this vision put upon international terrorism. Moreover, Holsti mentions on page 390 a section in which the U.S. definitely disregards any international resolution and approval for the legitimate right for invading Iraq. Because of American exceptionalism, the Bush doctrine took it upon good fundamentalist faith, to go to war by pulling back from the United Nations, thus portraying the 3rd principle in the doctrine. Holsti’s depiction of American exceptionalism also goes hand-in-hand with Huntington’s argument of the a clash of civilizations at the governmental level, which shows how democracies attempt overthrow non-democracies, such as was the case with Saddam authoritarian regime.
American exceptionalism and therefore, new fundamentalism, is the solution to destroying units in an anarchy. A great nation such as the United States has the right to overcome chaos in the international arena in order to mitigate the Hobbesian state of Man in foreign affairs. At least, this was and might still be the belief of American society to this day, a belief which attempts at breaking through the level of disorganization. Nevertheless, there is a historic tendency in global affairs for humanity to always go about full circle and so a deeper argument should be considered to weigh down the Bush doctrine.
Third level of analysis with respect to the Bush Doctrine
Last but not least, my analysis leads to the third perspective. In the international spectrum, there is an anarchial order. Foreign affairs cannot be overlooked without this concept of Hobbesian State of Man in the chaos that is the World. Because of the constant existence of external threats, international disputes drive nations to a self-help stance, they themselves adding further tension to the security dilemma because arming themselves is a clear way to display strength and thus, security.
The Bush Doctrine is no different than previous American historical events, if we follow this argument. Indeed, we remember how Hobbes showed us in his “Leviathan” paper in chapter 13 page 100, how he classically laid out the fact it is in Human nature that “Every man is enemy to every man […] wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength.” Similarly, Waltz further reinforces this case on page 160 of his “Man, Sate and War” writing, where there is no sense of worldwide “harmony” in this natural, survival-for-the-fittest State of Man. The same author goes further by describing the structural process in foreign affairs and outlines the organizational units, being anarchical, in “Origins of War in Neorealistic Theory”. Here, we can follow up a discussion around the distribution of power and the stability of a bipolar world during the Cold War. It is only after the collapse of the Soviet Union, that the United States is left as the sole, unipolar ultimate power. This act, which we could deem as unbalancing in such an anarchical state of man, left doors open to further acts of deterrence in a conventional war, where the greater military power is left with great confidence about the outcome of said that conventional war. The first paragraph on page 626 “Origins of War in Neorealistic Theory” depicts this trend.
Consequently, we are able to associate such movements within the Bush Doctrine. Elaine Bunn quoted Condoleezza Rice on page 4 in “Preemptive Action: When, How, and to What Effect?”, defining the strategy of deterrence as mentioned by Waltz. The existence of such an action is in fact justifiable, indeed because of this constant threat of annihilation by other foreign powers. The primacy use of military force, which also implies preventative war clearly defines the purpose of self-defense at the international level, so laid out by the National Strategy for Homeland Security, published in July 2002 after the 9/11 attacks. One could therefore understand the rhetorical question so eloquently put by Condoleezza Rice: “At what point is danger imminent?” And so because you, as a powerful nation; having no possible expectation of others coming to help you; would you not take matters into your own hands since you actually possess the necessary capabilities to defend yourself? As such, you would logically not trust the chaotic state of foreign affairs. The Bush doctrine trusts in its ability to act preemptively as a means for protecting America from further attacks. Trustworthiness is not transparent at this level and so the United States need to pull back from international institutions and thus act unilaterally. Here again, we notice a pattern of intertwined principles acting upon each other. It all boils down to the concept of preemptive action as purely a necessity for self-defense in the anarchical world.
Finally but not least, the United States will go to apply deterrence or economic sanctions by pressuring other foreign powers. America, for the sake of their own protection, would take whatever measures they would deem as applicable to ensure national security. On page 218 of Skidmore’s “Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in U.S. Foreign Policy” reading, we have a clear example on how the U.S. ill-treated its allies, and threatened to block economic and military aid from 35 countries which declined to sign bilateral pacts proposed by the U.S. before the invasion of Iraq. In 2002, the international forum eventually capitulated and the U.N. Security Council approved immunity from I.C.C. prosecution to U.S. troops in six U.N. pacification missions. This act is no other than the American unilateral move over multilateralism to advance the Bush Doctrine, a founding principle of the latter.
To summarize, the international level of analysis would suppose that even if, hypothetically 9/11 never happened, American unipolarity would have still wanted to apply self-defense tactics as it always did throughout history. A small analogy of this self-defense act can be made, dating back to the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. When it comes to the survival of one’s very own existence, a powerful nation such as the U.S. would give no margin to error, and hence will always attempt to apply deterrence in foreign affairs or whatever else is necessary to ensure its security.
Part 2
After considerable analysis and by cross-referencing the various sources examining the Bush Doctrine, I arrived to the conclusion that the most insightful and ground-shaking perspective which best explains these events is seen at the very first level. Indeed, I have noticed a consistent return to the constant of individual’s biases and misperceptions seen throughout several readings, which surely motivated the application of the Bush principles. These views were transpired in the publication of the National Security Strategy by 2002. At the end of the day, and no matter through which lens one would look into, the individuals and sub-groups were the ones who influenced third and second level motivations.
The name which kept popping in my mind most often was Jervis. The perpetuity of misperceptions and biases during that time, regarding issues such as preemption, were so opaque that they left exposed to numerous critics with regards to the Doctrine’s true intentions. For instance, the misleading overestimation of the existence of WMDs in Iraq argued by Bush played a considerable role in motivating America’s principles, no matter how false those accusations might have been. If we recall on page 4 of “Preemptive Action: When, How, and to What Effect?”, Elaine Bunn goes along with Jervis, by saying how the Bush Doctrine failed to specifically define the meaning of “preemption”. Several individuals at the state level, but also the international arena, psychologically linked back the term to nuclear deterrence; a dangerous misperception which was infamously utilized during the Cold War. As soon as someone of influential position spoke out the crucial necessity for preemption action against Saddam’s regime and military capabilities, other state officials might have automatically assumed a direct link to WMDs, and so any further action would have already been drawn from unverified statements, which later on were proven to be false. Moreover, I can emphasis this misperception in the international forum. Bunn later mentions how other non-American politicians such as the Australian prime Minister John Howard was quoted to be using the term of “reason” of a nation utilizing any resources possible to preempt any threats in foreign affairs. He later on went to align with American intentions to change the legislation under the United Nations Charter for allowing preemptive action against terrorists. The Bush Doctrine’s principle of primacy use of force was therefore motivated by individuals. To add up, Dueck strongly advocates on explaining how most noticeably, the principles of primacy, American unilateralism and assertive spread of democracy, were subject to manipulation of sub-groups within the Bush administration (“Ideas and Alternatives in American Grand Strategy” article; pgs. 515, 520 and 531). There is no doubt as to the shear pressure imposed by neo-conservatists, just as we have seen with the new fundamentalist move, to advance the Doctrine following 9/11. Policy critics and politicians such as Kagan, Kristol, Charles Krauthammer, Richard Perle, Joshua Muravchik are some examples given through Dueck’s arguments. Furthermore, the primacist movement was opposed by other state official groups such as the defensive realists. The post-9/11 traumatizing, psychological bias flip, allowed this group to be over-shadowed by the offense realists, namely those within the military branches who argued the need for invading anti-American nations such as Iraq. I come back to Jervis’ “Understanding the Bush Doctrine” (pg. 366), where the example of John Gaddis is one of those realist state officials left shocked by such Bush doctrinal trends, indicating the clear human irrationality in foreign affairs.
At the bottom of the hierarchical pyramid, I left third level of analysis as the least insightful for arguing the Bush Doctrine. Without a doubt, the self-defense and security dilemma was not strong enough to justify the sudden turn in American preemptive action following 9/11.
In fact, it was only to the view of the American unilateralism, that external threats seemed to be most intense. The so-called anarchical state of man in the international arena, was relatively speaking, stable at the turn of the 21st century. If 9/11 did anything was essentially to confirm American hegemonic skepticism following the destabilization of the balance of power post-Cold War. American unipolarity was not the product of the Bush Doctrine because this status quo was already widely acknowledged by the international community. A disparate switch instigated by emotionally affected state officials post-9/11 allowed the Bush principles to be put to the test and eventually led to the Iraq invasion. Authors such as Morgenthau, who’ve described third level deterrence strategy in the balance of power, seems to have become somewhat outdated for the Bush Doctrine. As Jervis quotes: “These threats cannot be contained by deterrence.” (“Understanding the Bush Doctrine”, pg. 369). By reflecting further upon this argument, third level is considerably neutralized because of the supposedly sudden emphasis of new identity groups and not states, societies or international institutions. The infamous word of “fanatical Terrorists” so frequently used by the Bush Doctrine in American foreign affairs shows how these “new” individuals know no boundaries and that rogue nations shelter these people. Therefore, the American unilateralism turn, primacy use of force and pull back from international institutions were in essence not of a higher, live-or-die motive. The Hobbesian State of Man therefore cannot be an explanation for the invasion of Iraq. Even Waltz’ arguments are contradictory to these events because he highlights the importance of bipolarity in making sense of chaos within global affairs. Finally, groups such as the new fundamentalists, whom envisioned Wilsonian ideas for the spread of democracy, used the pretext of second level idealism to give sense to national security policy-making. Hence, this begs the following rhetorical question: how should we logically explain our motives (Bush Doctrine) to the international forum? An answer could be by giving good cause to national security and so link back to the need for self-help (see quote in “The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment” by Ikenberry, pg. 10).
As a consequence, we should reject third level propositions for the Bush Doctrine because they are too weak, to say the least. The assertive spread of democracy could imply more than just protection in an anarchical state of the world. American exceptionalism, pushed forward, first and foremost by president Bush and his administration, eclipses the existence of real threats. Realism has been put out of commission; a tendency which was already fragile during the Clinton administration. A monumental spark such as 9/11 permitted individuals, not the international organizational system, to encroach the Bush Doctrine.
