Gianluca Moldovan The three schools of thought in Chinese foreign policy:
Part 1
China as a defensive status quo power with regards to Chinese Foreign Policy
We begin our analysis by applying the first Chinese school of thought, which is the defensive status quo power. We see numerous interpretations adopting this mindset, which would explain Chinese foreign policy, particularly the exponential military buildup as of lately.
Indeed, let me start off by illustrating the socio-economic motives in order to explain these troublesome build ups. One core example would be China’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI) and Maritime Road Initiative (MRI). According to Hongyi Lai, the BRI is motivated by domestic political economic concerns. Because over the last 20 years, China has been experiencing a steady industrial surplus capacity and higher demand and supply within their Terms of Trade (imports/exports price balance), it has been seeking to strengthen its international positioning and defend vital trade routes. For instance, Hongyi argues how exports of steel and cement from the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) represents a “landmark BRI project” (“The Rationale and Effects of China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Reducing Vulnerabilities in Domestic Political Economy”, p.339). As such, first school of thought is not necessarily influenced by external geostrategic factors, but more domestically oriented, in which issues inside China such as changing demographics, labor laws or unemployment problems, obligate Chinese foreign policy to be more and more assertive in protecting its these trade lanes such as in the South China Sea (SCS) and the MRI linking its dependency to oil and energy supply from the Middle East and Africa, both representing 63.7% of the total oil imports into China (Hongyi Lai article p.341).
The first school of thought is furthermore motivated by a very strong self-defense, protectionist way of applying foreign policy. Mostly, China desires to protect its sovereignty and thus territorial integrity, including regions it deems to have always been part of China in its history, especially Taiwan, Hong Kong and Tibet. These being perceived as Chinese soil, the defensive mindset argues it is not challenging the current status quo but in fact, shows the international community that China should not be identified as a weak nation anymore. This protective bulldog analogy could be exemplified with the grand military parade for the 70th People’s Republic of China (PRC) anniversary. Zheng Wang is one of the authors providing a historic, national reason as to why manifesting this self-defensive position. Chinese foreign policy desires to defend such sovereign claims following their century of humiliation. In the 19th century, China experienced the “trauma” when it lost 7 wars against Western invaders such as the Opium Wars. It was thereafter forced to abandon Chinese sovereignty, from where colonists started to trade and control Chinese territory in their own free will, obliging China’s emperor to sign “unfair treaties”. Indeed, Wang uses the terms “Lü zhan lü bai” meaning “repeatedly fought and lost” and “Ge di pei kuan”, which is “to cede territory and pay indemnities”, and “Sang quan ru guo”; “to surrender sovereign rights and bring humiliation to the country” (“Never forget National humiliation”, p.48-50). Even more, China also considers possessing a “choseness” dimension; a “Kingdom under Heaven”; which has lived peacefully and harmoniously, prior to the century of humiliation, among other barbarian tribes and nations perceived as less advanced in contrast to Chinese dynasties. Wang recalls for instance the terms “Canlanwenming”, “a splendid civilization” or “Didawubo”; “the vast land and bountiful goods” to showcase the importance China had in Asia for trading with other sovereign civilizations (“Never forget National humiliation”, p.43). If we were to fast-forward today, we can indeed see how this mentality remains a strong suit among foreign policy, mainly around the BRI and MRI projects, especially in the SCS, which in part is considered in Chinese history as territorial rights. This could explain why there is increasingly high military presence in this region.
Moreover, Andrew Nathan reinforces this thinking by outlaying China’s foreign policy motivations. Driven by domestic factors, these are mainly fear-driven elements, one which would be perceived within a Hobbesian state of nature. For example, Nathan describes the 4 rings of China’s borders which are considered as fragile, and therefore vulnerable to external forces. China has a very poor geostrategic positioning in Asia as it is surrounded by numerous neighbors, who weren’t the most politically stable nations in history. These aggressive nations shows that China, although a Giant Power, is still a tenuous giant (“Domestic Factors in the Making of Chinese Foreign Policy”, p.181-184). Even more, these factors can be directly linked to Michael Pillsbury and his article about China’s 16 fears. Most noticeably, we can highlight the fear of invasion by land (nr. 4) or the fear of regional neighbors (nr. 16), and Chinese foreign policy concern regarding resource blockage and the chocking of vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the SCS and around the 1st and 2nd island chains, where the US Navy has a strong presence (fears nr. 1 to 3) (“The Sixteen Fears: China’s Strategic Psychology”, p.142-160).
Consequently, first school of thought explains that the expansion of Chinese military and navies are not only to defend its shipping lanes and trading routes but also and most importantly never to allow foreign invaders ever again to invade and risk suffering a similar era such as was the case in the century of humiliation.
China as a revisionist hegemonic power with regards to Chinese Foreign Policy
I continue my analysis by switching lenses to the second school of thought. Other, more hard-lined interpretations could explain Chinese foreign policy. They in essence are of a more revisionist tendency, as this particular setting suggests how China desires to overthrow US unipolarity around the Globe, hence becoming a new hegemonic power.
There is in fact a new reality which outsets the revisionist way of thinking. Robert Kagan talks about how the rise of a global competition the likes we’ve never seen before, sparks an ending to the belief of Fukuyama that History has ceased since the end of the Cold War (“The end of the end of History”, p.2-3). Nowadays, what we are witnessing is a new clash of civilizations, a tension of economic and social competition between autocracies and democracies, respectively China and the US. This rhetoric thus questions which would be the next world dominant power in the 21st century. We could as well connect this argument to Zhengyu Wu’s writings on how the naval buildup in the SCS by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) drives asymmetric approaches in Chinese foreign policy. We can in fact see how a balance of power tilts between this bipolar tension in the open-seas such as the Anti-access/Anti-denial (A2/AD) self-defense innovative system, aiming at deterring the US Navy’s (USN) hegemony around the SCS, and further into open-seas in the 1st and 2nd island chains (“Towards naval normalcy: ‘open seas protection’ and Sino-US maritime relations”, p.672-683). This example is a specific revisionist Chinese foreign policy move, displayed by Zhengyu Wu as “opportunistic assertiveness” in order to secure the SCS, where the depiction of geostrategic positioning rests high on the military agenda. This kind of foreign policy treats the MRI as a priority for China.
Likewise, this hegemonic race for naval supremacy in South East Asia (and beyond), suggests how revisionist China not only desires to defend its nearby interests and apply pressure on its neighbors to ascertain dominance, but wants to expand further away and become a new model to the world, opposed to US hegemonic pressure. This is the argument used by John J. Mearsheimer, in which he underlines the absolute necessity for the US to maintain in any way possible its status quo power in the international community. This explanation is applicable within an anarchical, Hobbesian state of nature in which the survival of US hegemony is directly challenged by a rising power. The “not-so-benign US” section in Mearsheimer’s article shows how China perceives any American naval assets as offensive, as was the case in 1996 when the USN moved its aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Strait (“The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia”, p.385-386).
To further advance the second school of thought, Chinese foreign policy seems to adopt a similar approach as was the case with the rise of Athens, portrayed in Thucydides’ biblically-laid historical account “From history of the Peloponnesian War”. Revisionism generally speaking argues a premise in anticipation of an eventual hegemonic war, described as Thucydides’ trap; the inevitable clash of two giants. China’s rise as a naval supremacist in the SCS can consequently be directed back to Athens’ naval expansionism during Ancient Greece in the Aegean Sea. This eventually led to a vicious spiraling in the security dilemma for Spartan hegemony, which resulted in the Peloponnesian war (431-405 B.C.E.). China similarly is implementing a foreign policy for a blue navy-style fleet capable of covering vast regions in the open-seas, where the SCS would be their center of operations, therefrom allowing them to reach out from the Western Pacific all the way to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. In fact, China now even has a naval base built in Djibouti, which could be an foreign policy example explaining their direct challenge to US open-seas hegemony. Robert Gilpin applies more in-depth analysis about this particular school of thought, where this shift in the balance of power disturbs the status quo of a current hegemony. At the time, the “thesis” being Spartan conservative hegemony, was challenged by an “antithesis” meaning Athens’ exponential rise as a new and modern economic, social and military naval might. The circle would thereafter be completed by a “synthesis”, determined by the outcome of this hegemonic war. A new World Order; or to put it in a more modern fashion; a new international system would be created by the Victor. Revisionist school of thought also explains why it would be impossible for two very different types of government (or societies) to co-exist. Athens for instance was a democracy, raised by refugees and slaves, with innovative socio-economic values. These being frowned upon from the Spartan perspective which was an autocracy, felt an existential threat, as it was a more land-dependent nation, founded upon slavery and monarchic principles (“The Theory of Hegemonic War”, p. 595-598).
If we follow this narrative, Chinese foreign policy today is driven by internal forces, due to the rise of state and popular nationalism. Suisheng Zhao notes how China adopted a “revolutionary” stance since Mao’s time and the rise of Chinese communism. The integration of China into the WTO, or the patriotic spectacle displayed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the 2008 Olympic games, could validate this so-called “bolster in nationalist practices” in China (“Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: the strident turn”, p.539-541). The 9-dash lines delimitation in the SCS is hence, national soil and waters all together, according to nationalist Chinese behavior. As a result, the appearance of leaders such as Xi Jinping among other individuals and sub-groups, might cause external viewers to believe that Chinese foreign policy is a fire-breathing dragon revisionist after all.
China as a new kind of great power with regards to Chinese Foreign Policy
Last but not least, the third school of thought is neither a bulldog nor a dragon. Mythologically speaking, Chinese foreign policy takes on the form of a “Fenghuang”, the Chinese phoenix mythical bird reigning over the Middle Kingdom. This being said, third school of thought revolves around features representing Confucian values such as virtue, duty, propriety, credibility and mercy.
Indeed, Feng Zhang in his table of “Major Fault Lines in Debates on China’s Foreign Policy Aims” describes China as a New Kind of Power, founded upon traditional Chinese ideologies and reduce risk propensity to a lower level in foreign affairs. For instance, no matter how concerning the SCS dispute seems to be perceived from the external viewer, Zhang does indicate how moderates attempt to stabilize as much as they can the region through dialogue and international agreements in order to deter misperceptions and so deflate the security dilemma we have so seen in the second school of thought (“Chinese Thinking on the South China Sea and the Future of Regional Security”, p.461-462). The SCS debacle for China as a new kind of power is about peripheral claims of core islands, not as a strategic foreign policy to control the whole water body, and not as a whole national interest, but rather to protect its vital lanes. These interests should not be at the expense of a zero-sum outcome for their neighbors, which could fuel deteriorating relations from the ASEAN states. Third school of thought implies that China possesses “moral realism” as a world power, capable of “humane authority” because in reality, China is technically speaking the naval supremacist in the SCS, wherefrom it could easily neutralize the weaker neighbors. China is the strongest army in that region after all. Consequently, Chinese foreign policy encompasses diplomacy and the Rule of Law in the international spectrum. Specific examples respecting this style of inter-relational foreign policy making, include the Code of Conduct agreed between China and ASEAN states to ensure stabilization in dealing with conflicts and territorial claims in the SCS. Huaigao Qi also sets out another distinctive factor on how Chinese foreign policy practices a desire to reduce unilateral tension. During the Vietnamese-Chinese oil rig standoff in 2014, China withdrew from the contested region of the Zhongjian island, after careful due diligence which included a Vietnamese perspective on the bilateral matter at hand (“Joint development in the South China sea: China’s incentives and policy choices”, p.225-228).
To understand this new kind of power, our analysis must incorporate Ren Xiao’s arguments on why China is different in its foreign policy practices. These are particularly drawn from its history and how Chinese philosophy from the Past influences current international behavior. Chinese foreign policy was ingrained into a tributary system, which allowed the Empire, prior to the arrival of Western forces, to practice peaceful and harmonious international trade with its foreign neighbors and barbarians. These external forces were mostly perceived to have been less advanced civilizations. Ren Xiao indeed talks about a “feng-gong” system as a two-way street, rather than the traditional Western concept of tributary system, in which one vasal nation or a subjugated state would pay tribute to its conqueror or monarch (“Traditional Chinese theory and practice of foreign relations”, p.103). This system applied to foreign policy ensured thereafter a pattern of interactions which allowed Chinese Sino-centrism to rely upon long term security. As such, these independent barbarians and other sovereign nations would have been the Middle Kingdom’s first lines of defense against foreign invaders, ergo the notion of “si yi” (“Traditional Chinese theory and practice of foreign relations”, p.106-108).
Feng Zhang further reinforces third school of school by underlying how China is an exceptional nation, just as Holsti described American exceptionalism. Zhang’s definition of “Tianxiaism” goes together with what was mentioned above, on how Chinese rulers and emperors were “Sons of Heaven”, with Confucian moral authority to reign over the known world, not physically, but rather spiritually. Traditional Chinese foreign policy as a consequence would be catered around a fundamental international rational. This rational was for instance strongly rooted during to the Ming dynasty, whence foreign policy were customed to quote; “share the fortune of peace with other polities”. Neo-tanxism seen today in this school of thought draws specific principles from those past eras but with a more unique touch; a touch which could be argued to be a first-of-its-kind in the history of civilizations. Mainly, we witness a mixture of traditional ancient Chinese practices with the lead of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its revolutionary aspect since the Chinese civil war. China became hence even more exceptional because the foundation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was a long term outcome of the century of humiliation, suffered by the decline of the Qing dynasty during the 19th century. With the modern touch of communism, China confirms to have a “right to moral superiority”. This type of government is absolutely different from Western concepts of what communism used to be (“The rise of Chinese exceptionalism in international relations”, p.308-310). As Zhang quoted, the “unique mixture of China’s traditional Tianxiaist aspiration and the modern ideology of communism” makes China a new kind of power. Specific foreign policy concepts of such a philosophy today follow the values of great power reformism or benevolent pacifism, in which Zhang distinguishes Chinese exceptionalism from American exceptionalism. Indeed, instead of spreading its values such as was the case with the American “Manifest Destiny”, China never desired to do the same. Chinese foreign policy never forcibly asserted Chinese principles to foreign lands. In fact, in Zhang’s article, we can notice terms used such as ‘li bu wang jiao’; the Chinese do not go to foreign lands to teach ritual, or the doctrine of ‘hua bu zhi yi’; the Chinese do not govern foreign peoples (“The rise of Chinese exceptionalism in international relations”, p.319). Historical facts have been recorded and support these ideas such as the incredible expeditions exercised by admiral Zheng He, whence Chinese naval supremacy was at its peak. However, they never conquered foreign regions. Instead, the admiral ensured security over the maritime silk-road trade lane against piracy and promoted trade with various cultures. This perhaps ancient example might seem futile to mention and may sound outdated today. Nevertheless, third school of thought insists upon such examples as we are trying to grasp the fundamental meaning for reviving the ancient silk roads with the modern Belt Road and Maritime Road Initiatives (BRI, MRI respectively). Thus, instead of suggesting a Western colonization-like expansionism, Chinese as a new kind of power is a self-centered harmonious and benevolent power, prone to being more inclusionist rather than revisionist.
If we were to apply this kind of foreign policy with regards to the BRI and MRI, third school of thought relies on the importance of rebuilding the habitual “three routes” by strengthening “traditional cargo-trading” between Eastern and Western routes and advance infrastructure and development. This would allow China to break off from dependencies such as the US-pacific routes and commit to a more long-standing, sustainable international relations as befits the benevolent and prosperous traditional ideas. Such is the explanation laid by Hu Zhang on the vital Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), civil exchanges and investment programs such as the 2014 Chinese-established Silk Road Funding Corporation (“Rethinking the Silk Road” p.49-50). These types of “soft power” initiatives exercised in Chinese foreign policy, are interpretated by Pan and Lo’s arguments on third of school of thought. Because of Chinese choseness status and the traumatic period, the new kind of power wishes to demonstrate a newer model different to that of Western ideologies, guided altogether by traditional Chinese thoughts. At the same time, it follows the rules of liberal institutions and diplomatic cross-cultural linkages (“Re-conceptualizing China’s rise as a global power: a neo-tributary perspective”, p.8-11). Indeed, although communist in nature and perceived as a “steel-like” leader, Xi Jinping of the CCP acknowledged the importance and therefore validity of the United Nations, in his speech at the 75th UNGA last year. It also sees itself as an equal to the US nowadays, which could imply a world order equilibrium between both giants, making China indeed a new kind of power.
Part 2
After careful consideration from the numerous articles provided for our analysis, I concluded that the most insightful school of thought which is most applicable to Chinese foreign policy is China as a New Kind of Power.
Indeed, I believe we are beholding a unique combination of values drawn from Western ideologies such as communism and liberalism, paired with Eastern Asian traditional values. This phenomenon is something unseen before in Human History. Chinese foreign policy is a mixture of harmonious, Confucian-style inclinations with its neighbors, honoring the “Chinese Dream” for reconnecting with its West. They do so by rebuilding a modern version of the Silk Road, the now famous “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) project. But at the same time, it is adopting a tough stance in self-defensive posture, given credit by its traumatic history from the century of humiliation. As such, past events permitted the rise of Chinese nationalism and therefrom, communism after the second World War. With a self-determined, self-centered, righteous revolution mentality, Chinese foreign policy makers led by Xi Jinping and the CCP sets the tone of a hardened PRC. The message is clear that China will never again succumb to external invading forces.
As Peter Ferdinand put it, the collectively-led Chinese mindset is a cumulation of centuries of history. The Chinese Dream not only validates other paradigms and visions of countless civilizations around the planet. The Chinese Dream shows it is capable of greater ideals topping those of Western models (“Westward ho—the China dream and ‘one belt, one road’: Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping”, p.948-949). Chinese foreign policy does not desire a rise up which detriments international institutions, as would a Westerner’s perception of a fire-breathing dragon be. Instead, the new kind of power clearly pleas for positive-sum outcomes. After all, the metaphor of the powerful but benevolent Chinese phoenix as a creature living in harmony with its surroundings is what Chinese exceptionalism wishes to stand for. It desires to display a new, more aspiring model for nations which have experienced similar traumatic events in their own history, contradicting Western models. Indeed, intense competition is unavoidable with the current American status quo. Debates have shown on many occasions how inflamed the rhetoric stands between both parties. And so China as a new kind of power is showcases how renewed mentalities like their OBOR projects reconnect Asian and African countries. Reconnecting with Europe, the latter being the birthmark of liberal and democratic values, is the most intriguing aspect in Chinese foreign policy (Peter Ferdinand paper, p.954-955). China covets avoidances for provoking conflicts, namely because they understand what it feels like to be a nation without sovereign power. China as a new kind of power is a philosophy which has endured over centuries of struggle and survived up to this day. It is therefore safe to say that Chinese civilization can be considered as one of the oldest and most resilient civilizations in humankind. One then begs the question as to how did it survive for so long, and even strives today in the 21st century. I go back to Ren Xiao’s article on how he accentuates the notions of “de” (virtue) and “li” (reason) in foreign relations, which today take on the form of neo-tanxism in Chinese foreign policy. Pre-dominated by a need of “all-inclusive (wuwai) order”, foreign policy is encompassed around the international forum (“China and International Relations”, p.109-112). The Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) or the Tokyo MoU for the exchange of information along these MRI and BRI projects are specific examples of Chinese foreign policy pooling in these aspirational efforts (“Rethinking The Silk Road”, Hu Zhang, p.51-52). The Chinese Dream desires to extend a cohesive interconnectedness with other economies and nations around the globe.
To contrast what was proposed above, I believe that China as a revisionist, second school of thought is the least insightful on explaining Chinese foreign policy.
If truth be told, there is usually a biased tendency to compare and notice some events depending on our beliefs and experiences in life. Individuals, and therefrom nations are susceptible of misperceptions. Although complex, one must get as close to the realities as possible in order not to misunderstand what transpires in global affairs. A clear mistake in such practices was for instance the Bush doctrine which led to the Iraq War. If we take a closer look into Chinese foreign policy, even Mearsheimer, as thorough as his analysis may be for labelling China as hegemonic revisionist in nature, himself acknowledges the risk of miscalculations. Of course he indirectly underlines the anarchical situation among nations. There will always be mistrust with others about what truly happens in foreign relations. He also points out how difficult it is for external eyes to distinguish offensive against defensive weapons, the first being revisionist in nature as opposed to defensive for the latter (“The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia”, p.382-384). Nevertheless, it is a non-concluding factor to determine that China is a revisionist, mainly because we have seen, through their international practices that they do not want to repeat the Past. Parring the risk of a security dilemma in international relations, it is after all evident that a nation with centuries of cross-cultural interactions and sufferings, would want to strengthen its military capabilities, regardless if they were offensive or defensive. Even if foreign policy is led by the CCP party, Chinese core values and principles are still heavily embedded into Confucian beliefs. The weight of carrying a millennium of past heritage demonstrates the resilience of China and confirms the extent to which it can ensure its survival without forceful means.
Moreover, the theory of hegemonic war does not necessarily result into an inevitable Thucydides’ trap. The end of the Cold War is a monument which is a clear evidence that a hegemon and a revisionist do not have to result in a destructive finale. Chinese foreign policy relies more and more on its own path for creating new trade relations. It attempts to detach from the dependency of unipolarities by reconnecting with its neighbors around the SCS or in the West for example. As such, we can indeed confirm an intensification in competition, but this does not mean the US and China will result in a direct conflict. Xi Jinping and other CCP leaders have indeed declared the importance of respect and reason in assemblies such as at the ASEAN meetings to diffuse flared disputes in the SCS or at the UN meetings more recently. Chinese foreign policy also seems to be driven by a universal concept of balance. In fact most importantly, they even declared to the World that they are now an equal to the US. I cannot stress enough how they were willing to announce this. They did not state that they are greater than the US. Consequently, it is crucial to point out the fact that even in its mindset, Chinese foreign policy is not purely hegemonically inclined. Dealing in absolutes is a grave misperception. I reiterate Kagan’s article about explaining how a new competition is underway between the two giants with different types of governments and values. If we are still talking about a return of History, what is there to say we will not see a very different kind of History in our future? There has been countless comparisons of a return to a new Cold War, but history has a tendency to output future events with very different versions.
Also, the references about the Kosovo 1999 war and how China opposed NATO invasion following the Chinese embassy bombing, shows a delicate intimacy in the relationship between Chinese state and popular nationalisms (“The End of The End of History”, p.4-5). The scandal allowed a rise of Chinese popular nationalism against Western hegemony but as noted from Suisheng Zhao’s analysis, even domestic Chinese nationalism is divided into several compartments. Thus, state and popular nationalism can have very different perceptions about foreign policy, and even contradict each other as was the case when the Chinese state government tolerated up to a certain degree anti-Japanese popular demonstrations in 2005, for the 4th May Movement anniversary. The government then started censuring its own citizens in order to mitigate international relation tensions. The state even utilized its autocratic powers to arrest some of the popular organizers (“Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: the strident turn”, p.541-542). This therefore begs the question as to how far could Chinese foreign policy afford to be a revisionist? It is hence clear that from the government’s perspective, Chinese foreign policy does not appeal for further deterioration in global affairs with nations like the US and Japan. This is merrily an example to showcase the limits of China as a hegemonic revisionist. One cannot in good faith afford any more miscalculated harsh decisions in the international forum, especially since we now live in an age where access to records is becoming a commodity. Individuals are aware of zero-sum outcomes and so Chinese foreign policy is driven by this consciousness.
This is why the second school of thought cannot hold any firm ground, at least not on the longer run if it wants to ensure its own survival in an ever-evolving international arena.
